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In economic discussions, currency board systems are frequently described as ar-
rangements with self-binding character to the monetary authorities by their strict
rules and establishments by law. Hard pegs and especially currency boards are of-
ten seen as remedies to overcome economic and ﬁnancial turmoils and to return to
low inﬂation. A sustainable debt level closely linked to a disciplined ﬁscal policy is,
however, a premise for medium-term success. We show in a two-period model that
the choice of a currency board can increase ﬁscal discipline compared to a standard
peg regime. We derive, furthermore, the conditions for a currency boards to gain a
stability advantage compared to a common peg system.
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11 Introduction
The experience on currency board systems since the 1990s has shown that this special
form of an exchange rate system can contribute to overcome eras of ﬁnancial turmoil and
can help to stabilize the economy after currency crises (Argentina, Bulgaria). Further-
more, countries without great experience in central banking – like e.g. the former Soviet
republics Estonia and Lithuania – achieved high credibility of their currencies, which is
reﬂected by a process of pinning down inﬂation from three digit levels to single digit rates
within a short period of time after introducing a currency board system. Recent experi-
ence also leads to the presumption that a currency board is less crisis prone compared to
a standard ﬁxed exchange rate system.
The gain in credibility and stability may be traced back to the high discipline of
monetary policy accompanied by the choice of a currency board system: It is established
by law and characterized by an absolute ﬁxed exchange rate to an anchor currency, full
coverage of the monetary base, and full convertibility. These features altogether imply a
strict rule of monetary policy by abstaining from an independent monetary policy. Calvo
(2000) strengthens that view by suggesting that in emerging markets when sudden stops
are possible, the emphasis should be on credibility, “where the central banker may have
to tie himself to the mast or a currency board to command any respect” (p.4).
Despite the successful reappearance of currency board regimes since the beginning
of the 1990s, only view of researchers have addressed to model the diﬀerences between a
currency board regime and a standard ﬁxed exchange-rate systems: Chang and Velasco
(2000), Oliva et al. (2001), Irwin (2004) and Feuerstein and Grimm (2006).
All these papers have in common that the eﬀects of ﬁscal policy and the role of
public debts are neglected or are captured by realizations of stochastic shocks. However,
although hardly analyzed in theoretical literature, the economic performance of currency
board countries, especially those in Europe and Hong-Kong, but also Argentina during
the period of 1991 to 1995, was good and accompanied by a sound ﬁscal policy and a
sustainable development of public debts. This has also been subject to many econometric
studies, like for example Ghosh et al. (2000), Fatas and Rose (2001), Sun (2003) and
Grigonyte (2003) to mention only a few of them.
In this paper, the focus will be laid on the stability and credibility of currency board
systems by additionally taking ﬁscal policy into account. The central questions of our
analysis are (i) whether and under what circumstances a currency board guarantees more
ﬁscal discipline and a more sustainable growth of debts compared to a standard peg, and
(ii) which factors contribute to higher or less stability of a currency board system.
The paper is structured as follows. First, related empirical literature and the few
existing theoretical papers on that topic are summarized. Second, we develop a two-
period macroeconomic model, which integrates ﬁscal policy and public debts. Third, we
use the model framework and show that optimal debt levels and the optimal amount
of government expenditure are lower under a currency board compared to a standard
ﬁxed exchange-rate regime, when assuming at the same time that both exchange rate
systems are maintained.1 Hence, we state that a currency board increases the discipline
1Maintaining the standard ﬁxed exchange-rate system means in this context that the exchange rate
2of ﬁscal policy. Fourth, we examine the stability of a currency board system by using
two numerical scenarios. We deﬁne the stability of a currency board as the diﬀerence
between the expected policy losses occurring in the cases that the currency board is
maintained and that it is abandoned. Then, we examine which factors drive the stability
of a currency board system and which factors contribute to less stability. Fifth, we ﬁnish
our theoretical analysis by comparing a currency board system and a standard peg regime.
In this context, we use the concept of the “credibility of an exchange rate system” which
denotes the probability that the current exchange rate system is maintained in the next
period. We derive the conditions under which a currency board gains a higher credibility
compared to a standard peg and vice versa. Sixth, we conclude and highlight the main
results of our analysis and give a brief outlook on further research.
2 Empirical and Theoretical Background
In the existing literature and in economic discussions, the eﬀect of the introduction of a
ﬁxed exchange-rate regime on ﬁscal policy is discussed diﬀerently.
On the one hand, there is a broad view that ﬁscal policy is the only remaining stabi-
lization instrument when large asymmetric shocks occur in a ﬁxed exchange-rate regime.
This may suggest that ﬁscal policy tends to be more expansionary in times of a recession
under a peg regime compared to a ﬂexible exchange-rate regime.
On the other hand, a country operating a ﬁxed exchange-rate system aims at a gain in
credibility and stability to achieve sustainable levels of the inﬂation rate and, thereby, to
create a sound environment for economic growth. Unsound ﬁscal policy and high debts,
however, can be interpreted by the private sector as an increasing risk of leaving the
exchange rate peg in the future. As policy makers realize that a collapse of the exchange
rate would induce high economic and political costs, they have an incentive to exercise a
more restrictive ﬁscal policy. This argument becomes even stronger in case of a hard peg
regime like a monetary union or a currency board, as the political costs of repealing such
a system are higher compared to a realignment under a soft peg. This is demonstrated by
Fatas and Rose (2001) and it is also an essential assumption in the theoretical analysis
of currency board arrangements by Irwin (2004).
In the following, we give an overview of the theoretical models and empirical ﬁndings,
analyzing the impact of a ﬁxed exchange-rate regime – and especially for the case of a
currency board arrangement – on ﬁscal policy. We begin with the work of Tornell and
Velasco (1995a, 1995b, 1995c and 1998). In the theoretical parts of their models the
eﬀect of a ﬁxed exchange-rate regime on ﬁscal policy is not uniquely determined, which
is against conventional wisdom. They distinguish in their model between two systems:
(i) money-based stabilization, where the central bank sets the money growth rate to some
constant and the exchange rate is obtained endogenously, and
(ii) exchange-rate stabilization, where the nominal devaluation rate is treated as a constant
(and could also be set equal to zero e.g. for the currency board case) and the money supply
remains pegged to its initial level and no realignment takes place, i.e. both the currency board and the
standard peg survive the ﬁrst period and are not replaced in period 2.
3is determined endogenously.
They show that ﬁscal discipline is in both systems inﬂuenced by the ﬁscal authority’s
intertemporal discount factor and by the level of the interest rate. Their main ﬁndings
are that money-based programs induce more ﬁscal discipline if the ﬁscal policy makers
are impatient, i.e. if the policy maker puts a greater weight on present utility than on
future utility. Exchange-rate based programs lead to a higher discipline of ﬁscal policy,
however, if the ﬁscal authorities are patient.
The intuition behind is that the choice of each system can be considered as a certain
rule to distribute the burden of the inﬂation tax intertemporally. Operating under a peg
system, the real exchange rate is determined by the central bank. Thus, ﬁscal authorities
can execute higher expenditures ﬁnanced by an increasing level of debt or a reduction
of foreign reserves in the short-run. Resulting from the fact that indicators like e.g.
foreign reserves are not transparent enough under a ﬁxed exchange-rate system to reveal
signiﬁcant ﬁscal imbalances, especially for the case of transition and developing countries,
the punishment of an unsound ﬁscal policy may be delayed to some future point in time
where the situation becomes “more unsustainable” and the peg collapses. In contrast,
under a ﬂexible exchange rate system an unsound ﬁscal imbalance is recognized by the
private sector in the short run, which leads to an expectation of higher future money
growth and thus to an immediate rise in the inﬂation rate.
These results are conﬁrmed empirically by several studies of Tornell and Velasco
(1995a, 1995b, 1995c and 1998). However, the authors do not distinguish between soft and
hard ﬁxed-exchange rate regimes and focus on Sub-Saharan countries during the 1980s
and Latin American Countries from 1960 to 1994, a time horizon where currency board
systems played no major role in those geographical regions.2
In a similar examination, Hamann (2001) compares exchange-rate based stabilization
programs to the broader class of other stabilization programs. The data used comprises
143 countries over the years 1960-1997 and includes stabilization via the adoption of a
hard peg in Ecuador (dollarization) and Argentina (currency board). The author draws a
conclusion which is in line with the results of Tornell et al.: The key argument in favor
of an exchange-rate based stabilization, to gain ﬁscal discipline by reducing the inﬂation
bias, is not conﬁrmed in the data. However, Hamann does not distinguish between
currency boards and other ﬁxed exchange-rate systems.
In contrast, in their empirical analysis on this topic Fatas and Rose (2001) split up
countries with ﬁxed exchange-rate regimes classiﬁed as hard pegs into countries belonging
to a currency area, dollarized countries and countries operating a currency board. They
show that belonging to a currency area – as for example to the European Monetary Union
– or dollarization are not automatically accompanied by a greater ﬁscal discipline. For a
monetary union, the results depend on the number of participating countries. Though,
they ﬁnd that currency board countries are associated with a more restrained ﬁscal policy
compared to the rest of the countries considered in their sample, also relative to countries
operating under other ﬁxed exchange-rate regimes. Furthermore, they show that the bud-
2In the Latin America sample only the very early years of the Argentinean currency board arrangement
are observed (1991-1994). As the time series of that sample starts from 1960, the currency board eﬀect
may be negligible when considering the performance of Argentina relative to other countries.
4get in currency board countries is shifted to components providing more social insurance
like transfers, subsidies and social security taxes, which contribute to a sound domestic
environment, too.
A further examination of the linkage between exchange rate regimes and ﬁscal re-
straints is done by Alberola and Molina (2002). In a theoretical model which analyzes
the ﬁnancing of government expenditure, the authors consider two instruments, namely
monetary and ﬁscal seigniorage. Monetary seigniorage is deﬁned as the process of money
creation and ﬁscal seigniorage as the increase in public debt holding by the central bank.
Based on an estimation using a broad IMF data set, it is shown that monetary seigniorage
has no signiﬁcant inﬂuence on the ﬁscal deﬁcit, whereas ﬁscal seigniorage by its nature
has. As sketched in their model, a standard ﬁxed exchange-rate regime does not increase
ﬁscal discipline as there is no prevention from creating ﬁscal seigniorage. However, under
a currency board system claims of the government disappear (or are reduced signiﬁcantly)
from the balance sheet due to the strict features of the currency board, which are ﬁxed by
law. Therefore, ﬁscal seigniorage is strongly decreased under a currency board arrange-
ment or even completely impossible in an orthodox system.3 They come to the conclusion
that a currency board arrangement creates ﬁscal discipline and cement their results by
an empirical investigation.
Grigonyt´ e (2003) analyzes the impact of currency boards on ﬁscal discipline in
ten central and eastern European countries. By estimating cross country regressions the
author exhibits that the three currency board countries Estonia, Lithuania, and Bulgaria
show a certain degree of ﬁscal discipline. The econometric studies suggest that a currency
board arrangement decreases government expenditure and improves the public balance.
The result can also easily be seen from the raw data, where the three countries show a
level of debt relative to GDP clearly below the average level of the rest of the countries
belonging to the European Union. Furthermore, Estonia and Lithuania attained ﬁscal
surpluses over the recent years and were also far above the average of the sample.
3 Model
We consider a small open economy with a credibility problem caused by macroeconomic
instabilities like e.g. a currency or debt crisis or by a lack of experience in policy-making
during a transition period. The economy comprises the monetary authority, a government
which decides upon ﬁscal policy, and the private sector. The monetary authority does
not necessarily make its decisions independently, but may be inﬂuenced or overridden by
the national government (Tornell and Velasco, 1998).
The output gap in period t is given by a modiﬁed Lucas-supply function of the form
yt = γ(πt − π
e
t) + wgt γ,w > 0 . (1)
The expression γ(πt − πe
t) is a measure for the eﬀect of surprise inﬂation on output:
Workers demand nominal wages that are suﬃciently high to cover expected average future
3The notion “orthodox currency board” describes a very strict interpretation of a currency board
system, where the policy makers have no opportunity to make use of monetary policy instruments. This
interpretation is mainly used for the theoretical analysis of currency board systems.
5price increases. As unexpectedly high inﬂation leads ex post to lower real wages, it
increases employment and, thereby, output.
Additionally, output is driven by the ﬁscal policy variable, gt, which equals total
government expenditure minus tax revenues and is, therefore, very close to the deﬁnition
of the ﬁscal deﬁcit. For simpliﬁcation, we will use the term “government expenditure”
to describe gt, henceforth. The term wgt reﬂects the impact of ﬁscal policy on output.
We assume that government expenditure comprises, on the one hand, supply-side policy
(e.g. produced output of state-owned companies or granting of subsidies), which enters
the modiﬁed Lucas-supply function and, on the other hand, demand of goods from public
authorities. We discuss this point more detailed, when introducing the inﬂation equation
later in the section.4
Note that exactly speaking yt denotes the deviation of output from its natural level
(i.e. output gap), as log natural output is normalized to zero. For reasons of clarity, we
refer to yt by using the notion “output”, henceforth.
The (real) stock of debts in period t is denoted by bt and is given by
bt =
(1 + r)(1 + qet)
(1 + πt)
bt−1 + gt . (2)
This means that the outstanding stock of debts bt−1 and the corresponding real interest
payments plus the government spending deﬁcit gt have to be ﬁnanced by the end of period
stock of real debts bt. The nominal interest rate r is taken as constant as we consider
a small open economy with perfect capital mobility; q is the fraction of foreign debts
on total debt, which is taken exogenously, and et denotes the percentage change of the
nominal exchange-rate in price notation.
In the following, we deﬁne ˜ bt−1 as the outstanding level of debt plus interest rate




˜ bt−1 + gt . (3)
Multiplying the ﬁrst summand by 1 = (1 − πt)/(1 − πt) yields
bt =
(1 + qet)(1 − πt)
1 − π2
t
˜ bt−1 + gt . (4)
Furthermore, as πt is assumed to be a small number close to zero, we use the approximation
π2
t ≈ 0 and obtain
bt = (1 − πt + qet − qπtet)˜ bt−1 + gt . (5)
4The assumption that ﬁscal policy can aﬀect both the demand and the supply side is primarily used
for mathematical purpose to avoid corner solutions. In our analysis, we focus on a demand-side oriented
ﬁscal policy, as this seems to be the case which accords best with reality for developing and transition
countries. Therefore, w should be of small size. From a theoretical aspect, however, the two possible
directions of ﬁscal policy leave room for more ﬂexibility for the application of our basic model.
6As qπtet is approximately zero (again following the same idea as above), we ﬁnally obtain
the resource constraint for the government, which is given by
bt = (1 + qet − πt)˜ bt−1 + gt . (6)
The resource constraint used here is similar to that in Sachs, Tornell and Velasco
(1996) and Aloy, Moreno and Nancy (2003).5 Now, it is obvious that a devaluation,
i.e. an increasing et, increases (foreign) debts directly. In contrast, a higher inﬂation rate
πt leads to a decrease of the overall debt level. Government expenditure gt and the stocks
of debts bt and bt−1 are measured as shares of GDP. This seems to be most in line with
the deﬁnition of the natural output, which was normalized to one (log natural output was
normalized to zero, respectively).
To motivate the inﬂation equation used in our later analysis, it is necessary to look
more precisely on the idea of its derivation. It is assumed that in the considered economy
there exist tradeable and non-tradeable goods.6 Hence, inﬂation in period t is given
by the weighted sum of inﬂation in the tradeable good sector, πT
t , and inﬂation in the
non-tradeable good sector, πN
t . We can formulate the following equation:
πt = ξπ
N
t + (1 − ξ)π
T
t , 0 ≤ ξ ≤ 1 , (7)
where ξ denotes the weight of non-tradeable goods relative to all consumption goods. We
assume that in the tradeable good sector ﬁrms act under perfect competition, so that the






t + et + εt , (8)
where π∗
t denotes foreign inﬂation, et the change of the exchange rate in period t, and εt
is a random PPP-shock. We assume that the considered economy pegs its exchange rate
to a stable anchor currency like for example the US-$, EUR or JPY to (re)gain credibility
of its domestic currency. Hence, it is no major restriction to assume that the foreign
inﬂation rate π∗ is relatively low and can, thus, in the further analysis be considered as
being approximately zero.
In the non-tradeable sector, a certain degree of price-inﬂexibility caused for example
by price regulations in the good market sector and labor market frictions is supposed to
occur. Inﬂation for non-tradeable goods is given by
π
N
t = e πt + ιgt , (9)
where e πt reﬂects the part of inﬂation which depends on the asymmetric shock εt, on
exchange rate movements,7 on wage-setting behavior of ﬁrms in the non-tradeable sector
5Sachs et al. also include a seigniorage term µ(πt − πe
t,t−1), which is neglected in our analysis.
6The degree of openness of an economy in this model is considered as the fraction of tradeable goods
relative to all produced goods of this economy (and is thus mainly represented by κ and β, two parameters
we will introduce on the next page). Note that this deﬁnition is not typical. Usually openness is deﬁned
as export volume relative to GDP or as the sum of exports and imports with respect to GDP.
7We assume that a move of the nominal exchange rate changes the price of some input goods, which
lead also to a certain adjustment of output prices in the non-tradeable sector. However, the existence
of price rigidities hampers a complete adjustment of prices and some inﬂation inertia – i.e. the need for
further adjustment in the following periods – remains.
7and on the degree of price stickiness (which is closely linked to the wage-setting behavior).8
The last term of (9) represents the eﬀect of government expenditure used for demand
of goods to create surprise inﬂation, where ι > 0 is a weight factor. We assume to
have a complete home-bias in government expenditure which means that public demand
comprises only home-produced goods.
To summarize, ﬁscal policy works in two directions: A fraction of government expen-
diture is used to raise supply of goods, as mentioned when explaining equation (1) and the
rest is used for demand of goods aiming on pushing output above its natural level by cre-
ating unanticipated inﬂation. The latter case is the reason for having a time-inconsistency
problem of ﬁscal policy and monetary policy at the same time.
Referring to equation (7) and the idea brieﬂy sketched above, overall inﬂation in period
t can be formulated as
πt = κet + βgt + φt , 0 ≤ κ ≤ 1 and β > 0 . (10)
The exact size of the parameters κ and β depends mainly on the extent of wage and price
rigidities which are included in e πt. If markets were completely ﬂexible, κ would be equal
to one and β equal to zero, i.e. the stochastic purchasing power parity would hold for
both the tradeable and the non-tradeable sector.9
Finally, φt is a random shock, which describes the current eﬀect of the PPP-shock εt
on overall inﬂation πt. We assume that φt follows an AR(1)-process:10
φt = ηφt−1 + ut , η ∈ (0,1) , (11)
where the shock innovations ut are identically, independently distributed with zero mean
and σ2
u > 0 for all t. We, additionally, assume in the sections 4 and 5.1 that there is no
inherited shock from the ﬁrst period, i.e. φ1 = u1. We depart from this assumption in
subsection 5.2 to establish a fair comparison of a currency board and a peg and allow for
some shock persistence from period zero.
To motivate the inﬂation equation from the viewpoint of empirical evidence, we refer
to Cat˜ ao and Terrones (2003): They have shown by using a sample of 107 countries
over the period from 1960 until 2001 that there is a strong positive association of ﬁscal
deﬁcit and inﬂation.11 This result can be used as a further justiﬁcation of the form of
our inﬂation equation and especially for the inﬂuence of government expenditure gt on
8We forbear from a formal exposition of e πt as a function of all the enumerated eﬀects to keep the
number of parameters and variables tractable. Note, that in this context the wage-setting argument
is used for a more tangible motivation of some parameters, although the labor market is not explicitly
introduced into the model.
9In principal, β < 0 would also be possible if ﬁscal policy is mainly characterized by granting pro-
duction subsidies. As this seems to be highly implausible for developing countries and emerging market
economies, on which we focus here, we strictly exclude β < 0.
10φt represents an asymmetric shock that changes the equilibrium real exchange rate, which reﬂects
e.g. asymmetric business-cycle movements, demand-side eﬀects and exchange rate movements between
the anchor currency and the currencies of third countries. φt > 0 corresponds to the necessity of a real
appreciation and φt < 0 corresponds to the necessity of a real depreciation, respectively.
11The sample used in Cat˜ ao and Terrones (2003) comprises advanced countries, emerging-market
8inﬂation. Remember in this context that, by deﬁnition, gt is closely linked to the ﬁscal
deﬁcit.
The policy makers’ objective is to minimize a quadratic loss function which depends
on present and future expected inﬂation, and output as well as on outstanding debt at


































where ρ is the government’s intertemporal discount factor, E(bT)2 is the expected loss
resulting from outstanding real debt in the ﬁnal period T and θb > 0 is the policy makers’
relative weight on these debts.12 Analogously, θπ is the policy makers’ relative weight
of the inﬂation target. Political costs ci arise, whenever a policy maker under a ﬁxed
exchange-rate system, i.e. for our case under a standard peg or a currency board, decides
to realign its exchange rate peg or central rate, respectively. δ is a dummy variable,
which equals one when leaving the peg or the currency board and equals zero otherwise.
The superscript i of political costs denotes the type of the exchange-rate system to be
withdrawn, i.e. a standard peg system or a currency board arrangement. The policy maker
wants to push output above its natural level, which is characterized by the parameter k.
Therefore, the parameter k together with the weight of the inﬂation target θπ, can be
considered as the main factors which determine the time inconsistency problem of the
policy makers.
We restrict our further examination to a time-horizon of two periods, by focussing
on the policy makers’ decisions for the second period. Therefore, we rewrite (12) and
consider the second-period loss under the assumption that the “world will end after that














To summarize, the government dislikes inﬂation and debts, however, it prefers more output
to less, even beyond the natural output level (depending on k). The structure of the model
implies that several trade-oﬀs may occur, which are illustrated by the Trade-oﬀ Triangle
in ﬁgure 1 and explained in the following.
countries and other developing countries. They ﬁnd that “ﬁscal deﬁcits have been shown to matter not
only during high hyperinﬂations but also under moderate inﬂation ranges [...]”. Furthermore, the positive
correlation between the ﬁscal deﬁcit and inﬂation appeared signiﬁcantly in all groups of countries and
“surprisingly strong over a broad range of developing countries [...] ”, (p.26). These are exactly the
countries in the center of our analysis.
12By applying the debt term in the loss function, we guarantee that debt accumulation is not for free:
This means that we avoid costless accumulation of debt, which prevents the policy maker from creating
an unlimited amount of debts.
13Note that the intertemporal exposition of the loss function is needed to motivate the second-period
debt term θbb2
2 in the loss function.




































Inﬂation π2 Debt b2
¾ - . .
A) Inﬂation-output Trade-oﬀ: On the one hand, the policy maker has an incentive to
push output above its natural level by creating surprise inﬂation, on the other hand,
inﬂation itself contributes directly to the policy loss.
B) Output-debt Trade-oﬀ: Fiscal policy has an incentive to push output to the desired
level via its policy instrument g2, at the same time ﬁscal policy (or to be more
precisely the ﬁscal deﬁcit) has to be ﬁnanced by an increasing debt which accounts
by itself for a policy loss.
C) Debt-inﬂation Trade-oﬀ: On the one hand, the policy maker has an incentive to
lower its real debt level by a rise of the inﬂation rate, on the other hand, inﬂation
itself contributes directly to the policy loss.
Timing of Political Decision-Making
A key feature of the currency board is its establishment by law. Enoch and Gulde
(1998) consider a sound legal basis as an essential issue when introducing a currency
board, “because a currency board arrangement derives much of its credibility from the
changes required in the central bank law concerning exchange rate adjustments”, (p.42).
The legal anchor of the currency board arrangement gives reason that an abandonment
of the system is not possible over night. As a currency board is established by law, we
state that it can only be repealed, if this was announced one period in advance, i.e. before
the private sector made its expectations on inﬂation. The sequence of decision-making
of the private sector and the ﬁscal and monetary authority is depicted in ﬁgure 2.14 In
our model, the decision whether to repeal the currency board in a certain period or not
14As we, typically, consider countries with a credibility and stability problem, the central bank may
not be acting independently as aforementioned. Therefore, we assume that the central bank and the
government act simultaneously and can be considered as a “single authority”. We further assume, that
strategic behavior of ﬁscal and monetary authorities does not matter here.













is announced one period in advance – here in the picture at time ♦ before the private
sector forms second period expectations πe
2,1.
In the case of a standard peg, the ﬁxed exchange rate can be abandoned after observing
the shock which would actually be possible in each period and is labeled in ﬁgure 2 by
4. As we presume that a standard peg has some commitment value, too, we assume that
the policy maker will leave the peg earliest after the realization of φ2. This means that
a standard peg system survives at least in the ﬁrst period after its introduction.15 The
private sector has rational expectations about inﬂation πe
2,1, which are formed before the
future shock φ2 is observed. For a better understanding of the sequence, we use in ﬁgure
2 the notation πe
2,1 for the private’s expected inﬂation of the second period, which was
created in the ﬁrst period. For reasons of brevity we use in our calculations only the ﬁrst
indicator, which means πe
2,1 is rewritten as πe
2.
If the exchange rate is ﬁxed, the monetary authority has to abstain from an active
policy and surprise inﬂation can only be created by a rise in government expenditure gt.
If the exchange rate is ﬂexible, inﬂation can be inﬂuenced by a change of the nominal
exchange rate and by ﬁscal policy.16
4 Government Debts and Fiscal Discipline
4.1 Comparison of a Currency Board and a Standard Peg Regime
Subject of this section is to ﬁnd out whether a standard ﬁxed-exchange rate regime or a
currency board system induces higher ﬁscal discipline and a more conservative amount of
debts. Hence, we do not focus on the decision of maintaining or abandoning both types
of ﬁxed exchange-rate regimes. In fact, we aim at a comparison of the ﬁscal policy
and the choice of the debt level under a currency board and a standard peg
while both systems are maintained.
To be more precisely: The idea is to elaborate a theoretical explanation for the ﬁnd-
ings of the (empirical) literature demonstrated in section 2, which says that currency
15We do not model the optimal regime choice. In this model, we compare the losses occurring under a
standard peg regime and a currency board system. Both systems are introduced in period 0.
16Note that in ﬁgure 2 the arguments in the brackets, gt and et, are the policy variables of the ﬁscal
and monetary authorities through which the targets πt, yt and bt are determined.
11board systems increase ﬁscal discipline. Therefore, we compare losses occurring under
both exchange-rate regimes from an interim perspective.17 This means that we make the
assumption that the ﬁxed exchange rate is maintained in the second period under both
regimes (a standard peg and a currency board), but their survival was not obvious ex ante
and, therefore, the private sector may have a positive devaluation expectation under a
peg.
The optimization problem under both systems follows the same pattern. The systems
diﬀer only from the expected inﬂation rate of the private sector due to the diﬀerent timing
of political decision-making. We refer to this point again at the end of this subsection.
As the monetary authorities abstain from a devaluation, the resource constraint is
simply given by
b2 = b1 − b1π2 + g2 . (14)
Note that we have no longer to distinguish between domestic and foreign debts, because
exchange rate movements are excluded here: Neither a revaluation, which would reduce
the net value of real foreign debts, nor a devaluation, which would increase the real foreign
















with respect to the debt restriction (6), the output equation (1) and the inﬂation equation
(10). The ﬁrst order conditions of the problem are given by
(y2 − k) + λ1 = 0 (15)
θππ2 − γλ1 + λ2 + λ3b1 = 0 (16)
θbb2 + λ3 = 0 (17)
wλ1 + βλ2 + λ3 = 0 , (18)
and by the three restrictions (1), (6) and (10).
For a better exposition, we deﬁne A := w + γβ and B := (1 − βb1) . Due to the
domain of the parameters, it is obvious that A is strictly positive. B is also assumed to
be positive, as for developing countries and transition economies total government debt
ratios, b1, lie typically between 20% and 60% of GDP and as the parameter β is supposed
to be suﬃciently small. Note in this context that the Argentinean default on sovereign
debts in 2002 happened to be at a level of public debts of around 60% of GDP. Applying






θbB2 + A2 + θπβ2 −
(φ − βb1)(θπβ + A(γ + wb1))
θbB2 + A2 + θπβ2 . (19)





2) + φ2(θbB + wA) − θbβBb1
θbB2 + A2 + θπβ2 . (20)
17Note that it makes no sense to compare ﬁscal policy outcomes of both ﬁxed exchange-rate regimes,
if one or both systems have already been repealed. This problem belongs to another interesting aspect,
i.e. the stability of both systems, and is analyzed in section 5.1.
12The optimal rate of inﬂation depends positively on the second period shock, φ2, and
it is pushed by the desired output level k above its natural level. On the contrary, a
higher weight of the debts in the loss function, θb, may reduce inﬂation: In the considered
case, the central bank cannot create inﬂation to reduce (the domestic part) of the real
public debts, because the exchange rate is ﬁxed. Therefore, a reduction of government
expenditure, which actually lowers inﬂation, remains the only way how ﬁscal policy can
reduce debts. A higher weight of inﬂation in the loss function, θπ, makes inﬂation more
costly and, hence, contributes to lower inﬂation.




kA2 − θbb1AB − γπe
2(θbB2 + θπβ2) + φ2(θbB(γ + wb1) − θπwβ)
θbB2 + A2 + θπβ2 , (21)
where y2 depends positively on the second period shock, φ2, due to our assumption of
a very small ω and a relatively small β. Output depends also positively on the desired
output target k.





2)A + φ2(θbB − θπβ + A(w + γ + wb1)) + b1(A(γβ − 1) + w − θbB)
θbB2 + A2 + θπβ2 , (22)
where a high desired output target k and a large γ, the parameter which measures the
eﬀect of surprise inﬂation on output, both lead to an incentive to create surprise inﬂation
by raising demand and, hence, contribute to the policy makers’ optimal choice of a higher
ﬁscal deﬁcit g2. In contrast, an extremely high θb reduces government expenditure as the
reduction of debts is of major interest.
In the following, we calculate the ﬁrst derivatives of the policy variables with respect
to πe


















θbB2 + A2 + θπβ2 > 0 . (25)
As the expected inﬂation rate under a currency board is according to empirical evidence
smaller compared to the expected inﬂation under a standard peg regime, the following
result holds:18
Result 1. The lower πe
2 the higher is the discipline of ﬁscal policy and the lower are the
debts under the condition that the exchange rate is not changed.




2 is added in the following subsection.
To be more accurate, the lower expected inﬂation rate under a currency board compared to a standard
peg regime can be traced back to a lower expected devaluation under a currency board compared to a
peg.
13As a currency board is associated with a lower expected inﬂation compared to a standard
peg system, a currency board leads to more ﬁscal discipline and to a lower debt level.






θbB2 + A2 + θπβ2 < 0 , (26)
i.e. output depends negatively on the inﬂation expectations. This stands in line with
the empirical ﬁndings of e.g. Ghosh et al. (2000) when analyzing the eﬀects from
introducing a currency board arrangement on economic growth. Therefore, we draw the
following conclusion:
Result 2. The choice of a currency board can contribute to a higher growth of output due
to the lower inﬂation expectations of the private sector.
4.2 Inﬂation Expectations
In this subsection, we compare the expected inﬂation of the private sector under a currency
board system and a standard ﬁxed exchange-rate regime. At ﬁrst, we derive the condition
for which the expected inﬂation rate is lower under a currency board arrangement than
under a standard peg by using a theoretical approach to justify the assumption made
in the previous subsection. Subsequently, we refer to empirical work suggesting that a
currency board system may contribute to higher credibility which is expressed by lower
inﬂation expectations.
Theoretical Approach
To derive inﬂation expectations, we use a similar calculation as in section 4.1. The policy
maker optimizes the following Lagrangean, where we introduce e2, which denotes the
















+λ1(y2 − γ(π2 − π
e
2) − wg2)
+λ2(π2 − φ2 − κe2 − βg2)
+λ3(b2 − b1(1 + qe2 − π2) − g2) . (27)
At ﬁrst, we treat e2 like an additional parameter. The idea is to derive the expected inﬂa-
tion rate depending on an expected change of e2, to show in which direction a devaluation
drives the expected inﬂation πe
2.19
19Our analysis is limited to cases of a devaluation, as the need of an appreciation under a ﬁxed exchange-
rate regime is assumed to be less problematic as it usually does not indicate a typical crisis scenario and
is thus less interesting for the purpose of our analysis.
14The calculation follows the same pattern as in the previous subsection. By assuming
rational expectations of the private sector, expected inﬂation πe




βAk + ηφ1(θbB + wA) − b1βθbB + ee
2(wκA + θbB(κ − βb1q))
θπβ2 + wA + θbB2 . (28)
Due to the announcement of maintaining or abandoning the currency board one period










βAk + ηφ1(θbB + wA) − b1βθbB
θπβ2 + wA + θbB2 . (29)
Under a standard peg regime, a sudden realignment after the observation of the second
period shock, φ2, is possible. How the private sector’s expectation about second period
inﬂation is inﬂuenced by an expected devaluation of ee






wκA + θbB(κ − βb1q)
θπβ2 + A2 + θbB2 . (30)
If foreign debts are not too high represented by a relatively small value of q and the
economy is quite open (represented by κ approaching one), the sign of the terms inside the
brackets is positive and an expected devaluation causes an increase of privates’ inﬂation
expectations.
Furthermore, we know from the common literature that by assuming a certain distri-
bution of the new shock u2, multiple equilibria may occur under a standard peg regime.
As we do not focus on the exact value for the inﬂation expectations of both systems, but
on a qualitative comparison, we do not calculate the equilibria explicitly. If we assume
that an appreciation of the exchange rate is excluded as in the graphical explanation of
the equilibrium exchange rate in Obstfeld (1996), i.e. e2 ≥ 0, we can avail ourself on
the fact that the private sector is aware that with a certain probability – depending on
the realization of the second period shock – the policy maker will make use of her escape
clause and devalue the currency under a standard peg system. Therefore, we can state
that the expected inﬂation rate is a (probability weighted) mixture of the expected inﬂa-
tion rate for the case of defending the peg, which equals that of a currency board system
given by (29), and for the case of devaluing the exchange rate, given by equation (28).
According to the sketched idea, the following result holds:
Result 3. The private sector has a lower expected inﬂation under a currency board ar-
rangement than under a standard peg system, if (wκA + θbB(κ − βb1q)) > 0.
This condition is unambiguously fulﬁlled if the fraction of foreign debts relative to total
debts is not too large and the economy is relatively open, i.e. κ > βb1q.20
As a stable ﬁxed exchange-rate system is typically accompanied by a relatively small ratio
of foreign debts to total debts and a high openness towards the anchor currency, κ, it may




2 , in section 4.1.
20If we consider the extreme case that a standard peg is highly credible, i.e. the probability of a
devaluation equals zero, the expected inﬂation is the same under both systems.
15However, the opposite may be true for a relatively closed economy characterized by a
small value of the parameter κ and a large amount of public debts denominated in the
foreign currency: If the government devalues its currency, the real value of outstanding
debts increases. Therefore, a high level of foreign debts can have two diﬀerent eﬀects: It
may prevent the government from a devaluation and thereby implies ﬁscal discipline or it
may force the government to default on its debts as it happened in Argentina in 2001.
Note that it is easy to understand the argumentation used here, when a revaluation
of the exchange rate is excluded. However, when referring to the common literature on
time inconsistency, a desired output level above the natural level creates an inﬂation bias,
which makes a devaluation more likely than a revaluation. Therefore abstaining from the
possibility of revaluation is not necessary for obtaining result 3, but makes it more easy
to capture the line of arguments and avoids at the same time the distinction of further
cases, which are necessary to examine when inherited shocks and debts from the past are
considered.
Empirical Findings
The two common proceedings to estimate inﬂation expectations are to evaluate survey
data or to use the diﬀerence of the nominal and real interest rates of non-indexed and
indexed governments bonds as a proxy for expected inﬂation. Survey data can only be
obtained for Bulgaria and government-bond yields (especially those of indexed bonds)
are hardly available for any currency board country on a monthly basis, which would
be necessary to obtain enough observations for a meaningful estimation. Therefore, we
abstain from an own estimation and refer to two empirical papers, which suggest that
expected inﬂation under a currency board is lower than under a standard ﬁxed exchange-
rate regime.
Ghosh et al. (2000) compare inﬂation rates for countries with currency boards and
standard peg regimes and show that inﬂation under currency board regimes is lower than
under standard ﬁxed-exchange rate regimes. The ﬁndings can be used for claiming from
an ex post view that also the inﬂation expectations should be lower when operating a
currency board.
Carlson and Valev (2000) use survey data for Bulgaria to analyze whether the
introduction of a currency board system lowers expectations of inﬂation. The survey was
conducted a short time before the currency board was introduced and a follow-up survey
was conducted 10 months later. The authors show that already in the ﬁrst survey, the
people had a lower expected inﬂation rate due to the near introduction of the currency
board arrangement. In the follow-up survey, it became obvious that the introduction of
a currency board did indeed lower inﬂation expectations as well as actual inﬂation rates.
5 Stability of a Currency Board System
We analyze the stability of currency board systems by focussing on two aspects. First,
we try to ﬁgure out under what conditions a policy maker operating a currency board
system announces the continuity or the abandonment of the currency board. We examine
thoroughly how the change of some characteristic parameters like e.g. the policy makers’
16desired output deviation k, the volatility of the PPP-shock σ2
u, the inherited shock from
the ﬁrst period ηφ1, the inherited debt level b1 or the fraction of foreign debts on total
public debts q can inﬂuence the policy makers’ decision. We use a numerical approach to
obtain the results.
Second, we compare the stability of a currency board system with that of a standard
ﬁxed exchange-rate regime for a given set of parameters. Here, we use a similar concept
of the credibility of an exchange rate system, which is referred to the probability that the
considered exchange rate regime survives the second period. Analogically to the proceed-
ings of the ﬁrst part, we examine how the variation of some characteristic parameters
changes the credibility of a standard peg compared to that of a currency board system by
using four numerical scenarios. We derive the conditions under which the currency board
system induces a credibility advantage.
5.1 Decision-Making under a Currency Board
As the decision whether to repeal or to maintain a currency board regime is made before
the “new shock” is realized, we have to compare the expected losses of the next period
for both cases. We suppose that, whenever a monetary authority decides to repeal the
currency board, the exchange rate will be adjusted optimally, which means that the new
system can be characterized by a free ﬂoating exchange rate regime in our two-period
framework.21 The policy maker announces the continuity of the currency board system
in the next period if the expected loss of the free ﬂoat plus political costs cCB, which
arise when giving up the currency board, exceed the expected loss when maintaining the
currency board. Therefore, the critical threshold where the policy maker is indiﬀerent
between both systems is determined by
E(L
float
2 ) + c
CB = E(L
CB
2 ) . (31)
The solution is brieﬂy sketched in appendix C. To gain insights into the solution, we
use two numerical examples in the following for a quantitative exploration. Our analysis
focusses on situations, in which the policy makers’ main problem is whether to devalue or
not. Therefore, we assume that besides the existence of the time-inconsistency problem,
a negative shock hits the economy in the ﬁrst period. We make this assumption, as we
focus on examining situations characterized by the existence of a credibility problem,
which usually do not occur when a currency is revaluated.
The numerical values of the parameters in a ﬁrst scenario and a short explanation
of each parameter are depicted in table 1. In this scenario, the expected second period
loss under a currency board system is lower compared to a free ﬂoat system. The exact
numerical values for the expected losses in both cases are shown in table 2. Therefore,
in this scenario the policy maker would announce the continuity of the currency board
in period 1 — before the privates negotiate their wages (= build their expectation of
the second period inﬂation rate) and before the PPP-shock of the second period hits the
21Note that in this subsection, when referring to the free ﬂoat system, we discuss the case of announcing
the abolishment of the currency board arrangement.
17Table 1: Numerical Example, Scenario I
Parameter Numerical Value Explanation
k 0.02 Desired output deviation from the natural level
γ 1.00 Eﬀect of surprise inﬂation on output
w 0.09 Eﬀect of ﬁscal policy on output
(only ﬁscal policy addressed upon the supply side)
b1 0.20 Inherited stock of public debts
q 0.30 Ratio of foreign public debts to total public debts
κ 0.80 Eﬀect of the change of the exchange rate on inﬂation
β 0.30 Eﬀect of ﬁscal policy on inﬂation
(only ﬁscal policy addressed upon the demand side)
φ1 -0.03 PPP-shock of the ﬁrst period
σu 0.02 Standard deviation of the PPP-shock
η 0.80 Shock persistence
θb 0.2 Policy makers’ relative weight on debt target
θπ 1.20 Policy makers’ relative weight on inﬂation target
cCB 0.012 Political costs
Table 2: Expected Losses in Scenario I
Expected loss under a currency board Expected loss under a free ﬂoat
E(LCB
2 ) = 0.0270 E(LFloat
2 ) + cCB = 0.0436
economy. However, we do not focus on the explicit values of the losses under this scenario.
In fact, the aim is to show how the variation of a particular parameter value can inﬂuence
the expected losses in both cases and, thus, the stability of the currency board system,
while keeping the rest of the parameters ﬁxed. We measure the stability of the currency
board by the distance of the expected loss function in the currency board and the free ﬂoat
case in this section. The sensitivity analysis of the expected losses of scenario I is done
in ﬁgure 3.22 The pictures conﬁrm the results found in Feuerstein and Grimm (2006):
A high (negative) inherited shock from the ﬁrst period φ1 and a high volatility of the
shock innovation in the second period σ2
u increases the expected second-period loss under
a currency board relative to the expected loss under free ﬂoat system. This result stems
from the fact that an announcement to maintain the currency board system prevents the
policy maker from oﬀsetting the shock in the second period. Therefore, when the ﬁrst
period shock reaches some critical threshold the policy maker will announce to repeal the
currency board in the second period to lower its expected policy loss. A high volatility
of the “new shock” works in the same direction, as it increases the risk that the economy
will be hit by a large shock in the second period to which the policy maker cannot react
22Note that the vertical line in the single plots denotes the parameter set, which was used in Scenario
I.
18Figure 3: Sensitivity of Expected Losses (Scenario I)




































































































19under a currency board system.
A larger desired output level, k, which together with a relatively small θπ reﬂects the
main cause for the time inconsistency problem of ﬁscal and monetary policy (i.e. ﬁscal
and monetary policy try to create surprise inﬂation to raise output), leads to a higher
stability of the currency board system. The time inconsistency problem of monetary policy
is solved under a currency board as the monetary authorities’ decision is well-known at
the point in time where the privates create their expectations of inﬂation (see also section
4). However, the time inconsistency problem of ﬁscal policy given by the desire of the
policy maker to create surprise inﬂation by raising government demand persists.
The reason for an increasing level of k to improve the stability of a currency board
system, anyway, is based on the quadratic loss function, i.e. a higher deviation from the
target levels leads to a disproportionately high increase of the policy loss. In the case of
repealing the currency board arrangement, the policy maker can mix two instruments to
raise inﬂation, the exchange rate (e2) and government expenditure (g2), whereas when
maintaining the currency board only ﬁscal policy (g2) is available. An increase in g2
primarily leads to higher debts and an increase of e2 primarily leads to an increase of
inﬂation. As both, debts and inﬂation enter the loss function quadratically, the costs
of each instrument increase disproportionately high by more intensive use. So, in the
case of repealing the currency board, a higher value of k leads to a disproportionately
higher incentive to generate surprise inﬂation, compared to the case when the currency
board is maintained. Hence, the time inconsistency problem is more severe in the case of
abandoning the currency board, which is also reﬂected by a higher expected inﬂation of
the private sector.
The last two pictures of ﬁgure 3 suggest that a rise in the inherited debt level, b1, and
an increasing fraction of foreign debts on total debts, q, leads to a higher stability of the
currency board system:
A rise in b1 makes the time inconsistence problem of monetary policy more severe,
as the monetary authority has now the incentive to create inﬂation for two reasons: (i)
create surprise inﬂation to push output above the natural level, and (ii) create inﬂation
to devalue the level of outstanding real government debts. As the currency board solves
the time-inconsistency problem of monetary policy, a higher b1 leads to a higher stability
of the currency board.23
A higher value of q does not inﬂuence the loss if the currency board is maintained, i.e.
a devaluation is excluded. However, a desired output level above the natural level and a
negative ﬁrst period shock (see the parameter values in example 1) as well as a high πe
2
triggers the policy maker to a relatively large devaluation when an exit of the currency
board arrangement was announced before, and the exchange rate can be adjusted freely.
The same devaluation leads in case of a larger q to a higher growth of real debts, where the
growth rate itself depends on the size of foreign debts, meaning that a higher q contributes
to higher policy loss and, hence, it makes a currency board more stable.
To abstain from sweeping something under the rug, we point out that when b1 and k
23Note that we solidly focus on the consequences in variations of b1 in our model, where we do not
incorporate the possibility of a default on government debts or binding credit market constraints, which
may both play a major role from a practical point of view.
20are varied the result may be contrary if the policy maker puts an extremely high weight
on public debts in the loss function, which is given by an extraordinary high θb. However,
as for developing countries such an extremely conservative behavior is not observable,
our results of example 1 seem to be robust with respect to the most relevant political
scenarios.
In the following, we apply our analysis once more to a “stressful” scenario for a policy
maker operating a currency board system. Now, a larger negative PPP-shock inherited
from the ﬁrst period, a higher shock volatility, a greater weight of the inﬂation target in
the loss function and zero exit costs are assumed in scenario II.24 The exact parameter
values used here are given by table 3. The choice of the parameter set enables to exhibit
Table 3: Numerical Example, Scenario II
Parameter Numerical Value Parameter Numerical Value
k 0.02 φ1 -0.06
γ 1.00 σu 0.04
w 0.09 η 0.80
b1 0.30 θb 0.20
q 0.30 θπ 2.00
κ 0.80 cCB 0.00
β 0.30
an example in which, contrary to our ﬁrst scenario, the policy maker decides to announce
to exit the currency board system in the second period. We make the free ﬂoat case (i.e.
the incentive of abandoning the currency board) more attractive by choosing a higher
policy weight of the inﬂation goal, a higher volatility of the new shock, a raising inherited
ﬁrst period shock, and exit costs of zero. The comparison of the losses of a free ﬂoat and
a currency board is given in table 4.
Table 4: Expected Losses in Scenario II
Expected loss under a currency board Expected loss under a free ﬂoat
E(LCB
2 ) = 0.0586 E(LFloat
2 ) = 0.0439
Our main interest of the examination of example II is to ﬁnd out, whether variations
in the parameters φ1,σ2
u,k,b1 and q work in the same direction as in example 1. The
results are depicted from ﬁgure 4.
From a qualitative view the results obtained in scenario II stand strongly in line
with the results in scenario I. One more aspect, which is emphasized by the plots of
this scenario, is noteworthy to mention: The pictures in the second row illustrate, that a
currency board has an intrinsic commitment value, i.e. its stability does not solely depend
24The value of b1 was also slightly increased for a better graphical exposition, but the same qualitative
results could be obtained for b1 = 0.2, which was used in scenario I.
21Figure 4: Sensitivity of Expected Losses (Scenario II)



























































































22on the existence of the political costs cCB, as we ﬁnd cases in which the continuity of the
currency board seems advantageous even when the exit costs cCB are equal to zero. This
result holds due to the characteristics of the currency board arrangement that it is deﬁned
by law and, therefore, cannot be abolished on short notice.25 This stands in contrast to
the ﬁndings of Irwin (2004).
To complete this analysis and to strengthen one central result, we take up once more
the variation of k to analyze, how a more severe (overall) time inconsistency problem
contributes to the stability of the currency board when directly comparing scenarios I
and II.
Figure 5: Time Inconsistency Problem: Comparison of Scenario I and II





















Figure 5 shows that despite a higher shock volatility, a negative inherited ﬁrst period
shock, and zero exit costs the loss of a currency board system is still increasing less
intensely when k rises compared to the loss of a ﬂexible exchange rate system and thus
a currency board achieves a stability gain. Therefore, we emphasize once more that a
currency board system can reduce the (overall) time inconsistency problem. However, for
25The time inconsistency problem of monetary policy is solved completely, but, the time inconsistency
problem of ﬁscal policy remains. As aforementioned, the overall time inconsistency problem is reduced
as surprise inﬂation is more costly if ﬁscal policy remains the only instrument to increase inﬂation. This
is the reason for the intrinsic credibility of a currency board arrangement.
23a given k, of course, the stability of a currency board decreases in scenario II compared
to scenario I.
This subsection is concluded by a summary of the central results found in the two
scenarios.
Numerical Result 4. The stability of a currency board system – measured as the diﬀer-
ence of the expected losses when deciding to maintain or to repeal the system – is relatively
high in cases characterized by
a) a relatively low volatility of the “new shock” u2,
b) a relatively low inherited ﬁrst period shock ηφ1,
c) a relatively high fraction of foreign debts q,
d) a relatively high desired output level k,
e) and a relatively high inherited ﬁrst period debt b1.
5.2 Comparison of a Currency Board and a Standard Peg
The credibility of a (standard) ﬁxed exchange-rate system and a currency board system is
measured by the probability that the system survives the second period. The proceeding is
motivated by the approach of Drazen and Masson (1994) and Feuerstein and Grimm
(2006). The comparison of both exchange rate systems is done by using the maintaining
probabilities of the systems. The technical part of this subsection is shifted to appendix
D, where the support of the uniformly distributed “new shock” is characterized and the
explicit formulas for the probabilities of maintaining the currency board and defending
the standard peg system are derived.
In this section we refer to four numerical examples to compare the currency board
system and the standard peg regime. The comparison is done in a similar way as in
the previous section: We use a given set of parameters and calculate the maintaining
probability of a currency board and the probability of defending the peg regime. Then
we analyze how the probabilities change when the value of some parameter is varied. In
our analysis, we aim at ﬁnding the absolute credibility advantage (given if one exchange
rate system has a higher maintaining probability than the other one) and at the change
of the diﬀerence of the maintaining probabilities caused by the variation of a particular
parameter. To derive the results from our numerical examples, which are supposed to hold
“more generally”, we lay a greater importance into the latter case. We begin our analysis
with scenario I and scenario II from section 5.1 (see tables 1 and 3). As the probability
of maintaining a standard peg regime depends strongly on the exit costs, we add exit
costs of c = 0.012 in scenario II. We, furthermore, assume that the exit costs under both
systems are of the same size. Due to the nature of these costs, however, the repealing
of a currency board should go along with higher political costs. Hence, the credibility
of currency board may be underestimated in several cases. Therefore, the arguments in
favor of a currency board are actually even stronger than stated here.
As already mentioned in previous sections, multiple equilibria may occur under a
standard peg regime. We abstain here from calculating these equilibria explicitly, but
24assume analogously to section 5.2 that the inﬂation expectation of the private sector is
a mixture of the inﬂation expectation under a free ﬂoat system and a currency board





2 + (1 − α)π
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2 with α ∈ [0,1] , (32)
where π
e,CB
2 is the expected inﬂation under a currency board system when its continuity
in the future period has already been announced. We discriminate between three cases of
the private sector’s inﬂation expectations under a peg system:
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Now, we can calculate the maintaining probabilities for the three peg cases and for the
currency board arrangement in scenario I and II. In the following, α is set equal to 0.5 for
the case of partial anticipated credibility of the privates. Table 5 shows that the currency
Table 5: Maintaining Probabilities for the Scenarios I and II
Currency board Peg (α = 0) Peg (α = 0.5) Peg (α = 1)
Scenario I 1 0.9890 0.9311 0.7882
Scenario II 1 0.5773 0.5318 0.4577
board system is maintained with probability one in both scenarios, which means that
the policy maker will always announce to keep on operating the currency board system.
Technically speaking, the support of the shock φ1 is a subset of the maintaining-interval
of the currency board, which was derived in appendix D. The peg system is maintained
with a slightly lower probability in scenario I, which is decreasing with an increasing
level of α. Table 5 also shows that in the second scenario, the peg is maintained with
a probability around 50% for all three cases of α. Therefore, the currency board has a
credibility advantage compared to a standard peg in both scenarios.
Remark. Prima facie the result seems unexpected: Although the peg system has one
more degree of freedom than the currency board, i.e. a policy maker can decide whether to
leave or maintain the peg after the shock realization, and although presuming that α = 0,
which means that the private sector anticipates full credibility of the peg, a currency board
performs better than a standard peg. We, however, do not focus on a welfare comparison,
but on a comparison of the credibility/stability of an exchange rate system. Therefore, we
state that a policy maker under a currency board maintains the system with a probability
of one for the given set of parameters. In contrast, the policy maker operating a standard
peg system will abandon the peg and, hence, makes use of the escape clause when a large
unfavorable shock occurs. For α = 0 this can indeed be welfare-improving compared to the
welfare achieved under a maintained currency board.
Not the result of scenario I itself, but, rather the explanation which parameters exactly
drive the credibility of both exchange rate systems is of major interest in the following.
25Figure 6 shows, how the credibility of both systems react to variations of the characteristic
parameters.
The main result, which can be drawn from ﬁgure 6 is that an increasing volatility of
the new shock σ2
u decreases the maintaining probability of both systems, but increases
the relative credibility of a standard peg regime. The result can be traced back on the
timing of the policy makers’ decision-making: A high volatility of the shock implies a high
risk to bear a large future shock. Whereas under a currency board system a sudden exit
in period 2 is not possible, the monetary authority operating a softer peg regime can do
a realignment in period 2, surprisingly. Therefore, a currency board is announced to be
abandoned with a higher probability in the ﬁrst period, and the credibility of a standard
peg relative to a currency board rises with an increasing σ2
u.
Furthermore, ﬁgure 6 suggests that for high values of θb, i.e. the policy maker puts
a high weight on debts in her loss function, a standard peg gains a relative credibility
advantage. A high θb triggers the policy maker to create inﬂation to lower real debts,
which is easily possible by a devaluation when the ratio of foreign debts to total debts, q,
is small as in the considered case. Therefore, the exit clause in the second period under a
standard peg may increase the relative credibility of the peg, meaning that if no favorable
second period shock materializes, the policy maker will devalue the currency. This option
is not possible under a currency board and, hence, may provide an incentive to the policy
maker to repeal the currency board more quickly.
The pictures in the fourth row suggest that a rising β leads to a relative credibility
advantage of a currency board. Note that β and κ are linked by the inﬂation equation
(10) and, therefore, an increase of β is supposed to be accompanied by a falling κ. As
we here vary only one parameter, we restricted the variation of β for a given κ on the
interval [0,0.5]. Hence, we restrict κ out of the same reason on the interval [0.5,1]. By
choosing these domains of κ and β, we assume that ﬁscal policy aﬀects inﬂation, however,
the main force driving inﬂation is still the central bank: Assume, for instance, that the
government raises demand by one percent and the central bank devalues the currency by
one percent at the same time, then the devaluation should have a greater eﬀect on the
inﬂation rate than ﬁscal policy has.
Unfortunately, for the rest of the parameters the probability of maintaining a currency
board remains at 100% and, hence, we cannot draw further conclusions on the changes in
the relative credibility of a currency board to a standard peg.
We mention here, for the sake of completeness, that the results from the graphs of
scenario II stand almost in line with the results of scenario I. We abstain, therefore, from
an explicit discussion.
To get further insights into the comparison of the credibility of both regimes, we use
two stress scenarios. We, now, drop the assumption, which was made in section 3 and
presume, instead, that a negative inherited shock hit the economy in period zero. Ana-
logically to section 5.1, we want to examine the behavior of the maintaining probabilities
of both systems, when devaluation pressure resulting from a negative inherited shock is
present. The shock has to occur in period zero (and not in period one) to establish a fair
setting for the comparison of the currency board and the peg system. Furthermore, we
have chosen the parameter values with the intension to establish a scenario, where the
policy makers’ advantage under both ﬁxed exchange-rate systems seems to be very lim-
26Figure 6: Sensitivity of the Maintaining Probabilities in Scenario I
α = 0 α = 0.5 α = 1






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































27Sensitivity of the Maintaining Probabilities in Scenario I (ad ﬁgure 6)
α = 0 α = 0.5 α = 1





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































28Table 6: Numerical Examples: Stress Scenarios III and IV















ited, i.e. besides the inherited shock from period zero, we assume a relatively high shock
volatility, a relatively high κ, and a relatively small β to appear. This makes monetary
policy more important as a stabilization tool, as the eﬀect of ﬁscal policy was strongly
reduced by the parameter choice in the scenarios III and IV and, thus, weakens the cred-
ibility of both ﬁxed exchange-rate regimes. The parameter values for both scenarios are
exhibited in table 6. The maintaining probabilities in the two scenarios are shown in table
7. In scenario III the maintaining probability of a currency board system is below 100%,
and in scenario IV a repealing of the currency board is announced for any ﬁrst period
shock, meaning that the interval in which the currency board is defended lies completely
outside the support of the shock φ1 or shrinks to zero (for technical details see appendix
D).
Table 7: Maintaining Probabilities for the Stress Scenarios III and IV
Currency board Peg (α = 0) Peg (α = 0.5) Peg (α = 1)
Scenario III 0.9367 0.4310 0.3913 0.3128
Scenario IV 0 0.5239 0.5256 0.4843
29The examination of the sensitivity of the maintaining probabilities to a parameter
change is done by a discussion of the ﬁgures 7 and 8, in the following.
In both stress scenarios, the three results found in scenario I and II are conﬁrmed from a
qualitative perspective:
• an increasing shock volatility σu leads again to a credibility gain of the standard
peg, while the absolute credibility is decreasing in both systems,
• an increasing β leads also to a credibility advantage of the currency board,
• a greater value of θb contributes to a credibility gain of the standard peg regime.
Fortunately, we can derive further results from the two stress scenarios: We start with
the parameter k, the desired output level of the ﬁscal and monetary policy authorities,
which determines (together with θπ) the time inconsistency problem of monetary policy.
While remembering the results from section 5.1, where we pointed out that the time
inconsistency problem of monetary policy is solved completely and that at the same time
the overall time inconsistency problem is reduced under a currency board system – which
is not the case under a standard peg due to the existence of an escape clause in period 2
– one would suppose that a higher k leads to a relative credibility gain under a currency
board system. The plots of scenario III and IV support that view, if α is greater than
zero. This result comes as no surprise, because α = 0 implies a full anticipated credibility
of the private sector and in that case the time inconsistency problem of monetary policy
is also solved under a peg by the deﬁnition of equation (32).
A decrease in θb leaves room for a more expansionary ﬁscal policy, which implies a
more severe time inconsistency problem (of ﬁscal policy). As a currency board reduces
the time inconsistency problem of ﬁscal policy, as mentioned before, which is not the case
for a standard peg, the credibility of a currency board increases compared to a standard
peg.
Scenario III further suggests that a higher inherited debt level from the ﬁrst period,
b1, leads to a credibility gain of a currency board system. The explanation corresponds
to that in the previous section: a higher b1 amounts to a higher loss stemming from debts
in the policy makers’ loss function, if debts are not reduced in the second period. To
reduce debts, the monetary authority has a higher incentive to create inﬂation, which at
the same time aggravates the time inconsistency problem of monetary policy. As the time
inconsistency problem of monetary policy is completely solved under a currency board
system, but remains, at least partly, under a standard peg system, a higher b1 suggests a
relative credibility gain of a currency board system.
A higher fraction of foreign government debts, q, leads ceteris paribus also to a credi-
bility gain of the currency board system. An increasing q makes the escape clause under
the peg, i.e. the possibility to devalue the currency, less important, because only the
fraction of government debts denominated in the home currency can be reduced. The
fraction of foreign government debts may even increase in real terms.
To summarize the ﬁndings of this subsection, we can state that in the ﬁrst two scenar-
ios, which presumably accord best with reality, a currency board has (in frequent cases)
an absolute credibility advantage compared to a standard peg. The argument is strength-
ened by the fact that we have assumed equal exit costs under both systems and have
30Figure 7: Sensitivity of the Maintaining Probabilities in Scenario III
α = 0 α = 0.5 α = 1






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































31Sensitivity of the Maintaining Probabilities in Scenario III (ad ﬁgure 7)
α = 0 α = 0.5 α = 1






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































32Figure 8: Sensitivity of the Maintaining Probabilities in Scenario IV
α = 0 α = 0.5 α = 1






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































33Sensitivity of the Maintaining Probabilities in Scenario IV (ad ﬁgure 8)
α = 0 α = 0.5 α = 1






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































34simulated the probability of maintaining the peg over the total range of possible shocks
φ1 to guarantee a fair comparison (see appendix D). This supports the empirical ﬁndings
that currency board systems have proven to be stable exchange rate systems over several
years, with only one abandonment (or breakdown) in Argentina.
The comparison of the credibility of a currency board and standard peg gives reason
to formulate the following conclusion:
Numerical result 5. The credibility of a currency board system and of a standard peg
are measured by the probability of maintaining the system in the next period. Using this
deﬁnition, the analysis of scenario I-IV states that a currency board gains a credibility
advantage compared to a standard peg, when
a) the time inconsistency problem is severe (represented by a high value k, and a small
value of θπ)
b) σu is low, which reduces the risk of bearing a high shock in the future period,
c) θb is relatively low and q relatively high, making a devaluation less necessary as a
stabilization tool,
d) b1 is large, which again leads to a more severe time inconsistency problem of mon-
etary policy, and
e) β is relatively large and κ relatively small, again making monetary policy (=a de-
valuation) as a stabilization tool less important.
Result e) makes only sense from a static perspective or from a purely theoretical point
of view. When discussing the stability of ﬁxed exchange-rate regimes, a high degree of
openness (κ approaching one) and no major frictions are generally seen as an essential
prerequisite for a long-term stability. Otherwise, asymmetric shocks to the anchor cur-
rency or a strong accumulation of debts will make a repealing of the currency board or a
realignment under the peg inevitable in the intermediate-term. To analyze such eﬀects,
a dynamic setting will be a necessary premise.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we examined two major issues, the ﬁscal sustainability and the stability
of currency board arrangements. In section 2, we summarized empirical and theoretical
work about ﬁxed exchange-rate systems and their impact on ﬁscal policy. The conclusions
drawn from the individual papers are quite diﬀerent. Some argue that choosing a hard
peg facilitates ﬁscal soundness, others ﬁnd a contrary interrelationship, but only a few of
them divided the hard peg regimes into subgroups and, thereby, focussed especially on
currency boards. Two empirical studies did this and both, Fatas and Rose (2001) and
Grygonite (2003), found that currency board countries actually tend to have a higher
degree of ﬁscal discipline compared to other types of exchange rate systems.
In section 3, we introduced the basic model. The main feature of a currency board
system is its anchorage by law. We state, therefore, that a currency board gains a high
35commitment value and cannot be abandoned surprisingly, but only if its abandonment
was announced one period in advance. In contrast, the policy maker operating a standard
peg regime can make use of her escape clause in every period. Thus, the time inconsis-
tency problem of monetary policy, which means that a policy maker tries to increase the
output level by creating surprise inﬂation through a devaluation, is solved. Though, the
possibility that ﬁscal policy is used to create surprise inﬂation via an expansion of demand
remains. And, therefore, the (overall) time inconsistency problem is not completely solved
under a currency board either, but it is reduced.
We showed in section 4 that a currency board leads to more ﬁscal discipline than a
peg system due to lower inﬂation expectations, meaning that the ﬁscal deﬁcits and debts
will be lower under a currency board system. The lower inﬂation expectations under a
currency board are justiﬁed, on the one hand, by using a theoretical approach and, on
the other hand, by referring to empiricism.
The examination of the stability of a currency board system was subject of section
5. First, we analyzed how the stability of a currency board changes when varying char-
acteristic parameters by using numerical examples. The stability of a currency board is
measured by the diﬀerence of the expected losses occurring when a currency board sys-
tem is announced to be maintained in the next period and when it is announced to be
abandoned. We showed that the stability of a currency board decreases, when a large
(negative) future shock is likely to materialize due to a negative inherited shock and a
high shock volatility. A currency board becomes more stable, if the time inconsistency
problem is severe, as it is partially solved through the timing of the decision-making under
a currency board. The stability of a currency board also increases by a higher ratio of
foreign debts relative to total debts and by an increasing level of overall debt levels. A
higher ratio of foreign debts makes a devaluation ceteris paribus more costly and reduces,
thus, the advantage of repealing the currency board. From an empirical perspective, how-
ever, the result seems to be somewhat surprising. The reason for that may be found in
not taking moral hazard aspects into account. A high level of (foreign) debts can create
an incentive of the policy maker to default on its debts like for example 1999 in Ecuador
and 2002 in Argentina, a behavior which is not covered in our model.
Besides that, we also showed that a currency board system has an intrinsic commit-
ment value, which means that we ﬁnd scenarios for which the currency board is maintained
although no exit costs exist. This characteristic originates from the reduction of the time
inconsistency problem, as aforementioned.
Second, we compare a currency board system and a standard peg system by introduc-
ing the concept of the “credibility of an exchange-rate system”, which is deﬁned as the
probability that the current exchange rate system will still be in operation in the follow-
ing period. We showed by using several numerical scenarios, that a standard peg gains a
credibility advantage if the stabilization of future shocks is of paramount interest. This is
the case if a high shock volatility exists. The result is traced back on the existence of an
escape clause under a peg, meaning that a policy maker can realign its currency optimally
after a large unfavorable shock hit the economy, which is not possible under a currency
board. In contrast, if the time inconsistency problem is the dominant problem, a currency
board gains a credibility advantage compared to a standard peg system. Furthermore,
we found that a larger amount of government debts and a higher ratio of foreign debts
36increases the credibility of a currency board relative to a standard peg. Also, a higher
impact of ﬁscal policy on inﬂation while at the same time the impact of a devaluation on
inﬂation is decreasing makes the exchange rate policy less important as a stabilization tool
and, hence, raises the credibility of a currency board system relatively to the credibility
of a standard peg.
To get insights into the debt evolution and the stability of a currency board system
over an intermediate time-horizon, we focus on an enhancement of the model to more
periods in our future research. However, as the parametrization makes the model already
woefully complicated in the two-period setting, further restrictive assumptions would be
necessary.
An additional interesting modiﬁcation of the model would be to incorporate nominal
interest rates endogenously: If debts are accumulated, private creditors would increase
the level of the rate of returns on government bonds to be willing to accept further debts
due to the demand of a higher risk premia. We suppose that this would also aﬀect the
stability and credibility of a currency board system. In this context a consideration of
borrowing constraints would be meaningful, too.
37A Calculations for a Fixed Exchange Rate System
In the following part of the appendix, we determine optimal ﬁscal and monetary policy
under a ﬁxed exchange-rate system. At ﬁrst, we make the assumption that expected
inﬂation is treated as given. The results of the calculations are used in section 4.1 and
in section 5. After that, we reformulate the loss function and determine the rational
expectations equilibrium for the case of the exchange rate peg being defended with a
probability of one.
A.1 Optimization with Exogenous πe
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+λ1(y2 − γ(π2 − π
e
2) − wg2)
+λ2(π2 − φ2 − βg2)
+λ3(b2 − b1(1 − π2) − g2) . (33)
The ﬁrst order conditions are
∂L2
∂y2
= (y2 − k) + λ1 = 0 (34)
∂L2
∂π2
= θππ2 − γλ1 + λ2 + λ3b1 = 0 (35)
∂L2
∂b2
= θbb2 + λ3 = 0 (36)
∂L2
∂g2
= wλ1 + βλ2 + λ3 = 0 . (37)













(y2 − k) . (38)
















+ k . (39)
Restriction 3 (=debt equation) solved for g2 yields
g2 = b2 + b1π2 − b1. (40)
Inserting into restriction 1 (=output equation) leads to
y2 = γ(π2 − π
e
2) + wg2 = γπ2 − γπ
e
2 + wb2 + wb1π2 − wb1
= π2(γ + wb1) + wb2 − wb1 − γπ
e
2. (41)














Some further manipulations lead to
π2 = −
θb(1 − βb1) + w(γβ + w)
(γ + wb1)(γβ + w) + θπβ
b2 +
(k + γπe
2 + wb1)(γβ + w)
(γ + wb1)(γβ + w) + θπβ
. (43)















2 + wb1)(γβ + w)(1 − βb1) − (φ2 − βb1)
¡
(γ + wb1)(γβ + w) + θπβ
¢
(γβ + w)2 + θπβ2 + θb(1 − βb1)2 .
(45)
For a better exposition and to simplify further calculations, we deﬁne A := w + γβ and
B := (1 − βb1). Note that from the domain of parameters used here A > 0 and B > 0 is







θbB2 + A2 + θπβ2 −
(φ2 − βb1)(θπβ + A(γ + wb1))
θbB2 + A2 + θπβ2 . (46)














2) + φ2(θbB + wA) − θbβBb1
θbB2 + A2 + θπβ2 , (47)
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kA2 − θbb1AB − γπe
2(θbB2 + θπβ2) + φ2(θbB(γ + wb1) − θπwβ)
θbB2 + A2 + θπβ2 . (48)










2)A + φ2(θbB − θπβ + A(w + γ + wb1)) + b1(A(γβ − 1) + w − θbB)
θbB2 + A2 + θπβ2 .
39The derivatives of optimal second period output, inﬂation, debt, and of the policy instru-
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(γβ + w)2 + β2θπ + θb(1 − βb1)2 < 0 . (52)
A.2 Reformulation of the Loss Function as a Function of π2
For a better handling in section 5, we rewrite the loss function by using the calculations
of the ﬁrst section of appendix A (for a given πe
2). From equation 41, we have
y2 = π2(γ + wb1) + wb2 − wb1 − γπ
e
2 . (53)
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A.3 Rational Expectations Equilibrium




2 = E(π2) =
βAk + ηφ1(θbB + wA) − θbβb1B
θbB2 + wA + θπβ2 . (57)





βAk + ηφ1(θbB + wA) − θbβb1B
θbB2 + wA + θπβ2 + u2
θbB + wA
θbB2 + A2 + θπβ2 . (58)
26Rational expectations equilibrium values are denoted by the superscript “**”.













B(βAk + ηφ1(θbB + wA) − θbb1βB)
β(θbB2 + wA + θπβ2)
+ b1 − u2
A(γ + wb1)
θbB2 + A2 + θπβ2 , (59)











The rational expectations equilibrium is used in the sections 4.2 and in section 5. Note
that we, of course, can calculate the optimal size of government expenditure (=ﬁscal
deﬁcit) g2 for the rational expectations equilibrium, too.
B Calculation for a Flexible Exchange Rate System
We, here, derive optimal ﬁscal and monetary policy under ﬂexible exchange rates. At
the beginning of this section, we make again the assumption that expected inﬂation is
exogenous. The results are used in section 4.1. Thereafter, we reformulate the loss
function and determine the rational expectations equilibrium.
B.1 Optimization with an Exogenous πe
2 and an Exogenous Ra-
tio of Foreign Debts q


















+λ1(y2 − γ(π2 − π
e
2) − wg2)
+λ2(π2 − φ2 − κe2 − βg2)
+λ3(b2 − b1(1 + qe2 − π2) − g2) , (61)
where e2 and g2 are the policy instruments to reach the output-, inﬂation- and debt-goal.
The ﬁrst order conditions are
∂L2
∂y2
= (y2 − k) + λ1 ⇔ λ1 = k − y2 = 0 (62)
∂L2
∂π2
= θππ2 − γλ1 + λ2 + λ3b1 = 0 (63)
∂L2
∂b2
= θbb2 + λ3 = 0 ⇔ λ3 = −θbb2 (64)
∂L2
∂g2
= −wλ1 − βλ2 − λ3 = 0 (65)
∂L2
∂e2
= −κλ2 − b1qλ3 = 0 . (66)





























γ(κ − qβb1) − b1w(q − κ)
wκ
. (69)
The ﬁrst order condition with respect to λ3 solved for g2 equals
g2 = b2 − b1(1 + qe2 − π2) = b2 − b1qe2 − b1 + b1π2 . (70)
The ﬁrst order condition with respect to λ2 solved for e2 yields




(π2 − φ2 − βg2). (71)














Using (62) and (68) yields




Inserting (71) into the output equation (ﬁrst order condition with respect to λ1), we
obtain
y2 = π2





(κb2 + qb1φ2 − b1κ) − γπ
e
2 . (74)
Using (73) with (74) yields
π2 =
(k + γπe
2)(κ − b1qβ) − wb1(qφ2 − κ)
γ(κ − b1qβ) + wb1(κ − q)
−
θb(κ − b1qβ)2 + (wκ)2
wκ(γ(κ − b1qβ) + wb1(κ − q)
b2 . (75)
By combining (69) and (75), we obtain the optimal second period debt level b2 as a





θπwκ(κ − b1qβ)(k + γπe
2) + θπw2b1κ(κ − qφ2)
θb(γ(κ − b1qβ) + b1(κ − q))2 + θπθb(κ − b1qβ)2 + θπ(wκ)2 . (76)
27We denote the equilibrium values in the free ﬂoat case by a superscript f, henceforth.
42We deﬁne E := κ−qβb1 and F := wb1(κ−q). E and F may both have either sign, mainly
depending on the size of foreign debts q and the openness parameter κ. From an empirical
perspective, however, a prerequisite for a stable exchange rate is a highly open economy,
which guarantees the ﬂexibility necessary to oﬀset unfavorable shocks (this means κ is
close to one); at the same time, a credibly stable exchange rate is characterized by the
fact that creditors trust more in domestic debts, which contributes to a small q. If this






2)θπwκ + θπw2b1κ(κ − qφ2)
θb(γE + F)2 + θπθbE2 + θπ(wκ)2 . (77)








γ(κ − b1qβ) + wb1(κ − q)
wκ
=
θb(γE + F)[E(k + γπe
2) + wb1(κ − qφ2)]
θb(γE + F)2 + θπθbE2 + θπ(wκ)2 ; (78)
and optimal output is derived from (73) as
y
f






θbE [(k + γπe
2)θπE + θπwb1(κ − qφ2)]
θb(γE + F)2 + θπθbE2 + θπ(wκ)2 . (79)








= k(θb(γE + F)
2 + θπ(wκ)
2) . (80)




k(θb(γE + F)2 + θπ(wκ)2) − θbθπE2γπe
2 − θbθπEwb1(κ − qφ2)
θb(γE + F)2 + θπθbE2 + θπ(wκ)2 . (81)
B.2 Reformulation of the Loss Function as a Function of π2
To simplify the calculations in section 5 and appendix D, we rewrite the loss function of
a ﬂexible exchange rate system. As shocks are perfectly oﬀset in this setting, output and
debts can be expressed as a multiple of π
f
2. Therefore, the loss function has the simple
form
















(κ − qβb1)2 + (θbwκ)2
(γ(κ − qβb1) + wb1(κ − q))2
¸¶
. (82)
43B.3 Calculation of the Rational Expectations Equilibrium










2 ) + wb1(κ − qηφ1)
i












θb(γE + F)[Ek + wb1(κ − qηφ1)]




θb(γE + F)[Ek + wb1(κ − qηφ1)]
θbF(F + γE) + θπ(wκ)2 + θπθbE2 . (84)




θb(γE + F)[Ek + wb1(κ − qφ2)]
θb(γE + F)2 + θπθbE2 + θπ(wκ)2 +
θb(γE + F)γE
θb(γE + F)2 + θπθbE2 + θπ(wκ)2
·
θb(γE + F)[Ek + wb1(κ − qηφ1)]
θb(γE + F)2 + θπθbE2 + θπ(wκ)2 − θb(γE + F)Eγ
=
θb(γE + F)[Ek + wb1(κ − qηφ1)]
θbF(F + γE) + θπ(wκ)2 + θπθbE2
−
θb(γE + F)wb1qu2
θb(γE + F)2 + θπθbE2 + θπ(wκ)2 . (85)
C Determination of the Threshold for Maintaining
or Leaving the Currency Board
The rational expectation equilibrium values for y2,π2, and b2 were depicted in section 4.1
(currency board) and part B (free ﬂoat) and are used in the following.
The characteristics of a currency board that its abandonment must be announced in






2 ) . (86)
Note that the exit costs cCB are given exogenously. The condition means that the policy
maker compares the expected loss which would occur if she decides to maintain the cur-
rency board with the situation in which she decides to abolish the currency board and
chooses the optimal exchange rate freely and optimally. The loss in the latter case, of
course, corresponds to the expected loss under a free ﬂoat. The comparison is done in the
following.
We again make use of the following abbreviations, which were introduced in the ap-
pendices A and B:
A = w + γβ > 0; B = 1 − βb1 > 0; F = wb1(κ − q); E = κ − qβb1 .
Note that when referring to the domains of the particular parameters E and F the ap-
pearance of negative values cannot be excluded per se.
44C.1 Determination of the Expected Loss under a Currency Board
Using equation (56), we calculate the loss under a currency board when inserting the




























We deﬁne D := θbB2+A2+θπβ2 and ˜ D := θbB2+wA+θπβ2. Both D and ˜ D are obviously
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θbB + wA − θbB2 − A2 − θπβ2
D
= w
Ak + ηφ1(θbb1B − θπβ) − θbb1B
˜ D
+wu2
θbb1B − γA − θπβ
D
. (89)
























































45The inﬂation goal θππ2
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4 + 2kηφ1Q1Q2 + 2ku2Q1Q3 + 2kQ1Q4













8 + 2kηφ1Q5Q6 + 2ku2Q5Q7 + 2kQ5Q8













12 + 2kηφ1Q9Q10 + 2ku2Q9Q11 + 2kQ9Q12
+2ηφ1u2Q10Q11 + 2ηφ1Q10Q12 + 2u2Q11Q12) . (93)














































+2kηφ1Q9Q10 + 2kQ9Q12 + 2ηφ1Q10Q12) . (94)
46C.2 Determination of the Expected Loss under a Free Float
Subject of this subsection is to determine the expected loss under a ﬂexible exchange rate











(κ − qβb1)2 + (θbwκ)2








Furthermore, we use the two deﬁnitions T := θbF(γE + F) + θπ(wκ)2 + θπθbE2 and
˜ T := θb(γE + F)2 + θπ(wκ)2 + θπθbE2. Of course, ˜ T is strictly positive. T is in most of
all cases also strictly positive as the signs of E and F are closely linked by the parameter
values of κ and q and have thus in most cases the same sign as discussed before.
Then, the rational expectations equilibrium of inﬂation, π
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The second period loss equals














4 + 2kηφ1R1R2 + 2ku2R1R3
+2kR1R4 + 2ηφ1u2R2R3 + 2ηφ1R2R4 + 2u2R3R4) . (96)
The expected value of L2 is given by
E(L
float













+2kηφ1R1R2 + 2kR1R4 + 2ηφ1R2R4) .
C.3 Comparison of the Expected Losses
The diﬀerence of the expected losses under a currency board and a ﬂoat is given by
D2 = E(L
cboard
2 ) − E(L
float





















































4 + 2kηφ1R1R2 + 2kR1R4 + 2ηφ1R2R4) − c
CB .
(98)
47As it is hardly possible to ﬁnd an explicit solution, we do comparative statics to compare
both systems in section 5.1 by using two numerical scenarios. The solution of D2 is
used for the MATLAB-simulations to obtain the numerical results and is interpreted as
a measure for the stability of a currency board system in section 5.1.
D Comparison of a Currency Board and a Standard
Peg
Before going through the technical details of the comparison of a currency board and a
standard peg, we introduce brieﬂy the assumptions made in this section:
• To compare the standard peg regime and the currency board arrangement, we use
the probability of maintaining each system. We, henceforth, interpret the proba-
bility of maintaining an exchange rate system as the credibility of that system (a
similar approach can be found in Drazen and Masson, 1994 or Feuerstein and
Grimm, 2006).
• We have to calculate the maintaining probabilities by comparing the expected second
period losses of a currency board / standard peg and the free ﬂoat case from the
view of period 0 after a shock materialized in period 0. In scenario I and II of section
5.2, we assume that there is no shock in period 0. Furthermore, we assume that the
standard ﬁxed exchange rate is defended in the ﬁrst period (this means that the peg
has an implicit commitment value in the ﬁrst period after its introduction), but can
be abandoned surprisingly in period 2. A currency board can only be abandoned
in period 2, if this was announced in period one, before the private sector’s wage
bargaining (inﬂation expectations) takes place and before the second period shock
occurs. Therefore, the maintaining interval of the currency board depends on φ1 and
the maintaining interval of the peg depends on φ2. The preparations to establish a
fair comparison of both systems despite the diﬀerent timing of decision-making is
done in the parts 2 and 3 of appendix D.
• When analyzing the standard peg system, multiplicities of πe
2 may occur if the pri-
vate sector has rational expectations of inﬂation (see discussion in section 4). There-
fore, in our calculations we treat πe
2 as an exogenous parameter. When comparing
the credibility of a currency board arrangement with the credibility of a standard
peg, we assume that inﬂation expectations under a standard peg are a mixture of
expectations under a currency board (full credibility) and a free ﬂoat system (zero
credibility).
D.1 Second-period Loss Functions (for a given πe
2)
In a standard peg regime, the policy maker decides whether to defend or to leave the
exchange-rate peg after the realization of the second period shock. Therefore, a policy
maker’s decision is based on a comparison of the loss functions (56) and (82) for a given
π
e,Peg
2 after the realization of the shock φ2.
48We begin with reformulating the loss function (56) by using the inﬂation equation
(47), where πe




(βD)2 ((βAk + βγAπ
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Now, we rewrite the loss function (82) of the free ﬂoat case by inserting the inﬂation































49where R0 and ˜ T were deﬁned in the second section of appendix C.
D.2 Credibility of a Standard Peg
To derive the range of the random variable φ2 characterizing the second period shock for





2 + c . (104)
Using the expressions for the loss functions, just derived in the ﬁrst part of appendix D,






























































































2P10P11 + 2φ2P10P12 + π
e
2P11P12)] ≥ 0 .
(105)
We focus on deriving mathematical expressions for the boundaries of the “defending-
interval” in case of a standard-peg regime, which can be determined if (105) holds with
equality. The boundaries itself are functions which depend on expected inﬂation πe
2 and
on the parameters k,q,b1,ηφ1,κ,β,cf,θb,θπ. We denote the set of parameters by S for
reasons of clarity. Therefore, solving (105) for φ2, we get the interval in which the standard








Note that we set the probability of maintaining the standard peg equal to zero, if by
solving the quadratic equation, which results from a comparison of the loss function for
φ2, the discriminant becomes negative. If we assume that the new shock u2 is uniformly
distributed with zero mean and standard deviation σu > 0, we obtain the boundaries of
the interval of possible realizations of the second period shock φ2 by28
φ
2 = ηφ1 − σu
√
3 (107)
φ2 = ηφ1 + σu
√
3 . (108)
28The expected value of a uniformly distributed random variable u is given by µu = (φ+φ)/2 and the
variance is given by σ2
u = (φ−φ)2/12. Using both equations, we can compute the support of u explicitly.
50For the comparison of the standard peg and the currency board system, we deﬁne the
credibility of both systems as the probability of maintaining the ﬁrst-period exchange-
rate systems also in the second period (see also Feuerstein and Grimm, 2006). The
probability of defending the exchange rate under a standard peg in period 2 for a given
realization of φ1 equals
















To avoid an unfair comparison due to the diﬀerent timing of decision-making in the
standard peg and the currency board system caused by a particular choice of φ1, we
calculate the probability of maintaining the peg as an average over all possible realizations





Prob(maintain Peg|φ1)dφ1 . (110)





















In our numerical examples of section 5, we used N = 50 “drawings” from the distribution
of φ1.
D.3 Credibility of a Currency Board
To compare the standard peg system with that of a currency board, we have now to deﬁne
how to measure the probability of maintaining the currency board. As decision-making
under a currency board arrangement takes place in the ﬁrst period, the maintaining-
interval depends on the ﬁrst period shock φ1. Due to the assumption of a uniformly







In this context, remember the assumption already made in section 3 saying that φ0 = 0,
which means that there is no inherited shock from period 0.
In the currency board case, multiple equilibria cannot occur due to the time structure
assumed in the model. Therefore, we can insert the unique equilibrium value for πe
2 into
the expected loss functions (see appendix C). To ﬁnd the boundaries of the interval, in








51for φ1. We obtain two solutions, which determine the lower and upper boundaries of
the maintaining-interval. They depend on the parameter set k,q,b1,σu,κ,β,cf,θb,θπ,
summarized by R, henceforth. Analogically to the proceedings in the peg-case, we set the
probability of maintaining the currency board equal to zero if the discriminant by solving
the quadratic equation for φ2 becomes negative. Then, the probability of announcing to
maintain the peg can be calculated by
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